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Crime and Mental Health Problems
in Norway—a Zero-Sum Game?
Dag Leonardsen
Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences
Through a historical overview, the author analyses the Norwegian wel-
fare society and the limits of a social-engineering approach to social 
problems.	While	economic	growth	and	welfare	benefits	expanded	 for	
many years, so did registered crime and mental problems. This paradox 
gives	a	justification	for	challenging	established	ways	of	thinking	about	
social prevention policies. Since the turn of the century, crime figures 
have decreased while the state of mental health has worsened. The 
author argues that if the price of the suppression of crime is the 
depression of mind, then the gains are indeed pyrrhic.
Keywords: Social prevention, mental health, crime, social engineering, 
Norway
Introduction
 In the 1970s, social scientists in Norway warned against a 
development in which prevention of social problems would 
become increasingly more difficult as political control over the 
economy was waning. Leading politicians echoed the message, 
and governmental documents from this time disclosed a wor-
ry about increasing crime and drug problems concurrent with 
increasing economic turbulence. The decision to open the Nor-
wegian economy to a European and global free trade market 
was synonymous with speeding up economic and social change, 
while political control would shrink. However, in accordance 
with social democratic ideology, the sovereign state should be 
capable of providing security for all citizens and safeguarding 
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social integration. For social democrats, an open economy would 
not impede such a promise, since shrinking governmental con-
trol of the economic system was to be compensated for by strong 
supportive measures directed towards the socio-cultural system. 
Broad varieties of welfare measures were continuously devel-
oped, and the idea of putting social values first was a guiding 
principle for the (Labour Party) government. Liberalism at the 
base (an open, free trade based economy) was accepted as long as 
one could implement social democracy in the superstructure.
 Accordingly, the government gradually changed its strate-
gies to prevent social problems. A rapid expansion of measures 
directed towards the family, the educational system (schools 
and kindergartens), crime and drug problems, child protection 
care, etc., took place, especially from the 1970s/1980s. Program 
policies built on action plans replaced a more structural and 
holistic way of thinking. 
 However, in spite of huge social investments, governmental 
as well as social science representatives continued in the follow-
ing years to send worrying messages about a change in the social 
climate. If the economy was running smoothly, this was not the 
case with the socio-cultural system; if the politicians succeeded 
in producing enough goods, they did not succeed in producing 
meaning for everybody. Crime, drug problems, mental distress, 
loneliness, even poverty (labelled new-poverty) gradually arose 
on the political agenda. The political response to this situation 
was more of the same--more and stronger measures directed to-
wards the socio-cultural system. In spite of what social scientists 
reported, no questions about systemic restrictions or value con-
flicts appeared. Instead, one hoped that ingenious social research 
in alliance with a strong political will to spend big money would 
cure the patient. The outcome was disappointing.
 At the turn of the century, the picture changed. Norway, like 
many other countries, experienced a turn-around trend in regis-
tered crime. It was reasonable to ask if it was the social engineer-
ing strategy that finally worked out. In 1996, Garland wrote about 
“the myth of the sovereign crime control” and about limits to 
state interventionist strategies. However, at the turn of the centu-
ry it seemed that Garland might have been proven wrong. When 
Alva and Gunnar Myrdal, two famous Swedish social scientists 
and politicians, declared in the 1930s that “we can prevent—
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technically it is possible to quite a high degree—illness, crime 
and asocial tendencies of different sort” (cited in Pratt, 2008, p. 
130), this prophecy could now have become true—at least con-
cerning crime. Or, is such a conclusion premature? 
 To answer this question we have to ask what the criteria for 
success are. Western governments, in their eagerness to combat 
social problems, have tended to split different symptoms of so-
cial disruption into separate and (apparently) unique sectors, 
each with their own specialized strategies. This way, social 
problems have been turned into social engineering challenges 
that should (and could) be handled by way of professional guid-
ance. However, while (the majority of) registered crime in Nor-
way has decreased during the last 15 years, mental problems 
have not. It seems that a positive trend in the war against crime 
has been accompanied by a comparative growth in mental suf-
fering. Accordingly, one could ask if mental health problems in 
today’s Norway merely represent another symptom (in addition 
to crime) of an unchanged (or even worsened) social climate—a 
climate in which the struggle for recognition and respect are as 
challenging as ever, but where social strain is expressed in a dif-
ferent way than before. Have striking in problems (like mental 
suffering) replaced striking out problems (like crime)? If this is 
the case, this should be a challenge even for criminologists.  
 In this article, I shall first describe, primarily referring to 
written public documents, the main changes in social prob-
lems and social prevention strategies in Norway since WWII, 
and document how the government gradually changed focus 
concerning how to prevent social problems. This change was 
based on the assumption that welfare policy strategies could 
compensate for a lack of macro-economic control. As a part of 
this account, I shall present what the politicians themselves de-
scribed as “the welfare paradox”: the fact that crime and other 
social problems increased in parallel with a huge expansion of 
different preventive measures. Why did a combination of eco-
nomic prosperity and social welfare investments not produce 
(as expected) less crime (until the turn of the century) and less 
social strain? 
 Next, I shall address the interesting observation that, from 
the turn of the century, registered crime decreased, while 
mental health problems seemed to increase. How can we 
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explain this paradox? While it is impossible to prove any strict 
causal link between these two observations, I want to present a 
hypothesis (nothing more than that) that the relationship could 
be more than coincidental. Are the decreasing crime figures 
an indication that our society has become more socially inte-
grated, or are social tensions today only expressed in another 
language? Is much of present-day crime prevention a type of 
window-dressing strategy that replaces one type of problem 
(crime) with another type of problem (mental distress)? Crimi-
nologists have argued that people in Japan, due to Confucian/
Buddhist/ Shintoist values, are policing themselves—hence so 
little crime in this country (Leonardsen, 2004). In this article 
I ask if a neo-conservative/neo-liberalist set of values fill the 
same disciplining role as “Asian”’ values do in Japan. The result 
might be less crime, but at the cost of more problems, like eating 
disorders, suicide, anxiety, depression, alcohol/drug dependen-
cy, electronic addiction/gambling, etc. As pointed out by Young 
(1999, p. 156), there is a sense in which the conservatives are 
completely correct: “If you wish to maintain an orderly society 
which is in essence unfair and inequitable you must train the 
individuals within it to accept the world as it is.” Maybe the 
Norwegian coin that shows little crime on its upper side has 
another side that discloses a strenuous social climate. 
 In line with Wilkinson and Pickett (2010, p. 26), one could 
dispute strategies where health and social problems “tend to 
be treated by policy makers as if they were quite separate from 
one another, each needing separate services and remedies.” 
Low crime rates are not all there is to “a good society.” Even 
though crime figures might be used as radar for reporting in-
teresting qualities about a society, one should not draw rapid 
conclusions from law-abidingness to social harmony (as the 
case of Japan might illustrate, see Leonardsen, 2004, 2010). What 
type of actions (for example, alcohol consumption) that happen 
to fall into the category of “crime,” or, alternatively, are defined 
as “social (but not legal) problems” will vary in time (histori-
cally) and space (culturally)? Crime is like a sponge (Christie, 
2004) that can absorb a broad variety of actions. If criminology 
is the study of crime, and crime is ephemeral, one can easily 
see that it is problematic to delimit criminology to fluctuating 
formal criteria (i.e., what is forbidden by law). If less crime is 
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accompanied by increased mental depression, little is gained, 
and one could ask if criminologists should focus more on gen-
eral social conditions and less on crime in itself. By asking these 
questions, this paper engages in the debate on “public criminol-
ogy” (Christie et al., 2011; Loader & Sparks, 2011) and “public 
sociology” (Burawoy, 2005), asking the pertinent question: what 
is (really) the problem? Based on my historical presentation on 
the next pages I want to pay attention to a tendency among pol-
iticians to abdicate from a value-based debate on social prob-
lems and instead confine oneself to a sectored, professionalised 
(evidence-based), and (often) instrumental approach. 
 Let me start with an overview of the way Norwegian au-
thorities have interpreted and reacted to social problems since 
1945. What did “giving priority to social prevention” mean in 
different periods?
Norway 1945-2016: From Economic
to Socio-cultural Intervention
 Crime prevention in Norway started out as a fight against 
poverty and a struggle for universal social inclusion. Crime was 
regarded as only one of many different expressions of social 
problems related to deprivation. The solution to the crime prob-
lem (and other social problems) was to create a socially integrat-
ed society through national control of the economy (from re-
gional and labor market policy to housing policy), and a strong 
redistributive welfare state (universal social benefits). This ap-
proach was the recipe that would bring society into social har-
mony. The inspiration from Keynes and Beveridge was obvious. 
What little crime there was would vanish because of collective 
redistributive action; this was the social democratic credo. 
 Accordingly, work and welfare became two sides of the same 
coin. The anticipation was that all types of social problems would 
fade as economic growth, full employment, and a universal so-
cial security system was safeguarded. The Ministry of Finance 
and the Ministry of Labour became the two dominant institu-
tions to remove distress, insecurity, and inequality. There was 
no disagreement that there was a complete overlap of interests 
between the economic and the socio-cultural system. What was 
beneficial for Norway, Inc. was beneficial for its citizens. “The 
28 Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Construction State” became almost synonymous to “The Welfare 
State,” and abolishing crime and other social problems could be 
converted into a question of money to meet well-known needs 
(and not, as later on, a question of knowledge and expertise to 
meet complex human needs). The period from 1945 and into the 
1960s was a period of optimism and enthusiasm. 
 However, reading governmental papers and the party pro-
grams of the (governing) Labour Party (LP) from the mid-1960s 
discloses an increasing uneasiness about social conditions in 
the country. A White Paper published in 1960 (Ministry of So-
cial Affairs, 1960–1961), reported that the crime increase was 
“explosive.” As a background to understanding this develop-
ment, Labour Party Leader Trygve Bratteli talked in 1965 at the 
Labour Party National Conference (LPNC) about the profound 
economic and technical changes that had taken place since 1945, 
and continued: 
Modern societies—to an increasing extent characterized by 
science and technical innovation—seem to have entered an 
essentially new type of development. What is happening is 
that some very profound changes take place at a very high 
speed. However, these rapid changes that take place in the 
everyday lives of ordinary people will lead to uneasiness and 
uncertainty, and it will lead to significant industrial and so-
cial problems. (LPNC 1965, p. 147) 
Increasing crime was an often-cited illustration of this “uneasi-
ness.” At the time of Bratteli’s speech, crime had been on a con-
tinuous upward trajectory for many years, and the registered 
number of crimes investigated by the police (per 100.000 inhab-
itants) doubled through the 1960s. The Labour Party’s Principal 
Program from 1969 reported:
Even in societies that have reached the highest material and 
technical level of standard one can register discontent, hu-
man callousness, conflicts and dissatisfaction. The industri-
al society has not succeeded in developing human ways of 
being together that satisfies basic social and psychological 
needs. We experience that people are alienated and that the 
competitive society and the one-dimensional cultivation of 
material goods generate a barren and empty life for many 
people. (Labour Party, 2001)
29Chapter Titlerime and Mental Health Problems in Norway
 To the extent that this description gives a fair portrait of the 
situation, the political ambition of “economic growth and con-
tentment” from the early 1960s had been only partly achieved. 
While the long-term program from 1957 had promised to “pay 
close attention to preventive health and social work” (The Min-
istry of Finance, 1957, p. 72), in the early 1970s public documents 
and social research indicated that something had gone wrong 
(e.g., book titles such as “The Myth of the Welfare State” [Nor-
way] and “The Hollow Welfare State” [Sweden]). The sudden 
increase in social security expenditures (the old means-tested 
poor law) represented only one worrying facet, as well as in-
creasing crime and drug problems. The politicians had to admit 
that the power balance between market forces and political con-
trol had developed in favor of the former: 
Largely we are still hampered by insufficient tools for polit-
ical control. We have too little knowledge about the society 
we want to change and the world we are a part of. We have 
to obtain more knowledge, more statistics, and more research 
documentation in all fields of importance for the change of 
society. (Kleppe, LPNC, 1969, p. 158)
 The perspective Per Kleppe—one of the main strategists be-
hind the Labour Party policy—presented, was twofold: (1) A so-
cially integrated society was dependent on political control over 
the economy; and (2) proper political control was dependent on 
knowledge-based documentation and valid statistical informa-
tion. In other words, the realization of the welfare state ideal 
had to be based on a happy marriage between political volun-
tarism and the developing social sciences. Since the economists 
had been successful in saving a wrecked economy in the 1930s 
(e.g., Keynes), it was now reasonable to expect that the social 
scientists could help in solving the evolving problems in the 
socio-cultural system. Party Leader Trygve Bratteli commented 
on this:
During a period of huge changes and reform of our soci-
ety, we have to give priority to the science about man and 
his environment, about the body and the health of our soul, 
about contact and living together, about human society and 
about human history. In every regard we have to invite the 
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help that science to an increasing extent can supply us with. 
(LPNC, 1965, p. 149) 
 Since the politicians assumed that social problems could be 
solved through a confident cooperation between themselves and 
social science researchers, these problems did not provoke any 
political questions regarding value priorities. Strong political 
commitment to intervene in the market processes in combination 
with a comparable strong belief in the problem-solving capability 
of the social sciences was what it took to stem crime and social 
uncertainties. Due to a well-equipped toolbox, no one should fear 
for his/her overall living conditions. In Norway, the government 
took control via a broad set of policy strategies. 
 However, with Kleppe’s declarations about lack of political 
control over the economy, the political priorities in the next de-
cenniums might seem surprising. While until the early 1970s 
politicians had had at their disposal governmental instruments 
that could soften some of the negative effects of the liberalized 
market economy, they now headed towards a further weakening 
of their own political control. Already in 1960, Norway joined the 
European Free Trade Association (EFTA), which meant a gradu-
al deconstruction of customs and tariff barriers. The immediate 
result was rapid geographical changes with extensive social ram-
ifications. Then, from the mid-1970s, an international depression 
resulted in a paradigmatic change in economic thinking. Keynes-
ian “demand-side economy” had to give way. From then on, 
monetarist principles “became the international policy to which 
all governments committed to an open world economy felt obliged 
to subscribe” (Gamble 1986, p. 34, italics added). The space for 
political manoeuvre, even in social democratic-oriented Norway, 
was in decline. This represented a serious political dilemma:
I will go as far as to say that I do not think we are able to 
carry out our aims as for our welfare policy in a society that 
is so strongly dominated by capitalist influence as Norway is 
today. The implementation of our welfare program takes as a 
premise quite a radical change of society. We are not running 
for ”adaptation policy.“ (Kleppe, LP’s Conference on welfare 
politics, 1971, pp. 81–82) 
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 In a situation with increasing social problems (the concept 
of the “client producing system” now became common), and 
with weakened political control of important economic vari-
ables, how was the government, with all its political ambitions 
regarding social prevention, to handle these challenges?
 In a speech to the National Congress in 1971, Minister of 
Social Welfare Odd Højdahl declared that it had come as a big 
surprise that social problems escalated in parallel to econom-
ic affluence and social reforms being attained: “[We] thought 
that the abolishment of mass poverty, improved housing, and 
better educational and working conditions, would make main 
elements of the welfare policy superfluous. However, it was not 
that simple” (LPNC 1971, p. 230). This “welfare paradox” (less 
poverty, more crime and social problems) was hard to under-
stand for those politicians who had their historical background 
in the 1930s (high unemployment) and the 1940s (war economy). 
 However, with the given priorities, there were no options 
for turning. “The strong demands for efficiency and productiv-
ity in different sectors of society make many people fall by the 
wayside,” Højdahl declared, but “the only solution is further 
economic growth. I will ask you not to equal economic growth 
with social problems” (LPNC 1971, pp. 254–255). The general 
perspective was (like in 1945) that what was good for the econ-
omy was good for people in general. Accordingly, the way of 
understanding the social problems of the 1970s was much the 
same as in 1945: it was through rapid (free trade-based) econom-
ic growth in combination with a broad variety of governmental 
measures that a crime resistant and socially integrated society 
could be sustained. The governing optimism was unaffected.
 Even though the Labour government through the first half 
of the 1970s had demonstrated a strong will to implement an 
extensive welfare policy (including regional, industrial, finan-
cial and labour measures), gradually the general economic de-
velopment in Europe changed. A process of abdication from 
political control of the economy became increasingly dominant 
at a time when the impetus for change escalated (Norway be-
came a turbulent oil economy in 1969, while at the same time 
the government prepared for Norwegian participation in the 
EU). However, the political ambitions remained the same. Tak-
ing care of soft values was more important than ever. Within 
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the framework of what was called a “new welfare policy,” the 
Labour Party continuously talked about “giving social values 
pre-eminence,” underlining that from that point on social val-
ues should be a premise for all types of policy planning. Stron-
ger focus was directed at developing what was called “self-sup-
porting networks,” not least because one had gradually reached 
an awareness that “the state cannot make people happy.” All 
these declarations were formulated at the same time as the 
winds of change were accelerating. The “panting competition 
society” (Vice-President Reiulf Steen, LPNC, 1973, p. 62) should 
from now on be transformed in the direction of “a real equal 
society where people have a chance of experiencing peace and 
prospects for developing all their abilities” (Steen, p. 62). How-
ever, such an ambitious aim could (according to Steen) be at-
tained only if stronger measures were introduced:
For the Labour Party there should be absolutely no doubt 
concerning the main perspective: by intervening directly 
into the societal system, by removing the causes of the prob-
lems, through the regional policy, through measures like 
rehabilitation allowance and rehabilitation employment, we 
will reach a society with people that function in accordance 
to their talents rather than investing a lot of money to repair 
damages evolving due to cold and inhuman conditions of 
competition in the labour market and in society in general. 
(LPNC, 1973, p. 66) 
 In short, the government continued having high ambitions 
for building what in political terms was designated a qualita-
tively better society. The trust in the social sciences for support-
ing the politicians with the necessary know-how to maneuver 
in a complex and mobile society remained uncontested. Facing 
the question of how much change society could take, the Min-
ister of Education and Research declared that “one of the most 
important tools for political governing that should be imple-
mented is an action program for social research” (Førde, 1980). 
The challenge was to make the social sciences a helping hand to 
solve the contradiction between mobility and how much turbu-
lence people could take. 
 At the beginning of the 1980s, the Labour Party Program 
(1981) described the social climate in Norway as follows:
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The strong economic growth has had its price…The rapid 
changes have created uneasiness, alienation and insecurity 
about the future. New human problems have appeared: new 
illnesses and new troubles. Drug abuse increases…Beneath 
the surface of wealth, we can find huge human and social 
problems that are unsolvable within the present system of 
dominating capitalistic features. (Labour Party, 2001, p. 14)
The Party Leader, Reiulf Steen, declared in 1981 that, “not at any 
time since WWII has social security been more vulnerable than 
now” (LPNC, 1981, p. 58). 
 Vice President Einar Førde expressed his worries by saying 
that “we can fill up a medium big Norwegian city with children 
suffering from what is known as ’serious lack of care’” adding 
that the youngsters’ optimism for the future had changed in the 
direction of pessimism and fear. The No-Future Generation had 
arrived. In 1983, social scientist Kolberg published a book ti-
tled “The Welfare State—Goodbye?” Five years later, Marklund 
(Sweden) published “Paradise Lost? The Nordic Welfare States 
and the Recession 1975–1985.” Both titles indicate the focus of 
the welfare state debate all through the period 1980–2010. 
 These were the years of a general right wing turn in politics. 
Norway, now economically strengthened through its new status 
as an oil nation, was no exception to this general trend of welfare 
contraction. The Labour Party’s hegemonic status was shrinking. 
During the period 1981–86/1989–90, and 1997–2000/2001–2005, 
Norway had conservative/centre-right governments inspired by 
neo-liberal thinking. While the Norwegian Labour Party held a 
rhetorical distance from this ideology, the neo-liberal influence 
was identifiable also within the social democratic camp. For one 
thing, during the 1980s and 1990s the party strengthened the 
course towards further European integration. After the party 
had lost a referendum in 1972 about Norwegian membership in 
the EU, a new proposal was launched in 1994. Once again, the 
Norwegian electorate voted No. Nevertheless, the Labour Par-
ty was a driving force for connecting Norway tighter with the 
European free trade market. When the campaign for full mem-
bership in the EU failed, the strategy (which succeeded) was to 
make Norway a member of the European internal market. The 
implication of this was more power delegated to Brussels and to 
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market forces, and, in spite of earlier claims, a weakening of na-
tional political power.
 Furthermore, during the period with a conservative govern-
ment (1981–1986), key members of the Labour Party prepared 
an ideological shift away from governmental and bureaucratic 
solutions, heavily dependent on taxation and centralized ar-
rangements, and invited a new debate on freedom, modern-
ization and market solutions. This took place at the National 
Congress in 1987. As Norway had become more integrated 
into the European, as well as the global economy, one had to 
acknowledge that, “the task for political organisations should 
be the setting of political aims and defining the framework. 
After that, it is the leaders’ and their employees’ challenge to 
reach the given aims. We believe this will redeem innovation 
and engagement” (Brundtland, LPNC, 1987, p. 21). Due to stron-
ger demands among the electorate for more individualized and 
tailor-made services, one should, Brundtland argued, be more 
sensitive to such demands. The main challenge was to see that 
services were offered on equal terms. Accordingly, it would be a 
good strategy to bring competition into the public sector. From 
mixed economy to mixed administration—this was the mes-
sage. The choice between public and private operation had to 
be made according to what was most convenient for reaching 
the given aim. Furthermore, people had to show more respon-
sibility themselves: “It is a main challenge to follow a strategy 
where people are empowered to handle their problems them-
selves” (Brundtland, LPNC 1987, p. 134). One precaution was 
taken: “We shall offer no compromises when it comes to stating 
that health, social security and education are so basic common 
needs that we will not allow commercialisation of these ser-
vices. In this connection I will recommend dogmatism,” Førde 
concluded (LPNC, 1987, p. 73). 
 How did this ideological shift affect the social climate in the 
country? Had the politicians’ promises about giving priority to 
social prevention and the alliance with the social sciences pro-
duced a better society? 
 Social research, public documents, as well as party pro-
grammes, disclose a rather worrying answer to these questions. 
In the Labour Party’s program for 1986-89, one could read that “a 
big and increasing number of children and youngsters are being 
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neglected, maltreated; they drop out of school and end up drift-
ing. Queues for getting financial assistance are increasing” (e.g., 
increasing unemployment rates and increasing housing costs) 
(Labour Party, 1986–1989, p. 74). In the 1990s, worrying signals 
referred to “too many children getting too little care and supervi-
sion,” and cases of incest, child maltreatment and children living 
on the streets represented illustrations of this (LP Election Mani-
festo 1990–1993, p. 53).
 The Labour Party Program from 1992 declared that “lone-
liness, fear, increase in psychiatric sufferings, increase in sui-
cides, even among children and young people, indicate that 
time and efforts do not suffice for giving the necessary care we 
should offer each other” (Labour Party, 1992, pp. 15–16). 
 An increase in crime (especially serious crimes) was part of 
the picture (until the turn of the century): while in 1980 there were 
3.3 persons per 1.000 charged for crime, this figure increased to 
6.4 in 1998 (The Ministry of Finance, 2000–2001). In the “Prin-
ciples and Values” program from 1996, the Labour Party talked 
about problems like lack of social network in society, little reci-
procity and contact among people, increasing crime, drug abuse, 
and mental illness. Suicide was one of the most frequent reasons 
for death among young people, mirroring increasing loneliness 
and social isolation among people in general. In 1996, Party Lead-
er Jagland announced that a new under-class and new class di-
visions were emanating. At the turn of the century, poverty had 
become an essential problem to combat; some 70,000 children 
were living below the poverty level (LP Election Manifesto, 2001–
2005); “many children are not in a position to have their dinner 
every day; they never go for a holiday; they cannot participate in 
school excursions” (Jagland, LPNC 2000, p. 6). A national com-
mittee reporting on the situation within Child Welfare Protection 
(NOU, 2000, p. 12) claimed that the challenges were formidable, 
and that preventive work had been neglected. Marginalizing 
forces in all fields of upbringing were described as very strong. 
The committee presented 50 recommendations, warned against 
simplistic solutions, and underlined the importance of focusing 
the value foundation in the social preventive work. In a White 
Paper (Ministry of Social and Health Affairs, 2001–2002), the 
government addressed eating disorders, loneliness and isolation 
problems, lack of care, maltreatment, behavioural misconduct, 
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drug problems, bullying, and lack of well-being as the most se-
rious challenges. Headache, depression, and stomach/back pains 
among youth signalled serious and extensive psychosocial prob-
lems. Another White Paper (The Ministry of Finance, 2000–2001) 
expressed worries about pressure regarding sex, competition, 
work, commerce, and scarcity of time. 
 Indicators on stress, dropout from school, reports to the 
Child Welfare Services, loneliness, suicide, drugs, use of antide-
pressants, and sleeping pills, disclosed a negative development. 
According to the governmental “Strategy plan for social preven-
tion” (Government, 2009), the share of young people having big 
problems or experiencing social maladjustment seemed to in-
crease rather than decrease. In a broad study on living conditions 
among youth, the research institution NOVA (2014) reported 
about a well-adapted (little crime) and largely home-staying gen-
eration, but with mental challenges (stress). The most recent data 
(Bakken, 2017) confirms this picture, but warns against a marked 
increase in self-reported depression, especially among young 
girls. The number of respondents reporting about experience of 
loneliness is the highest ever. The Norwegian Institute of Health 
(Bang Nes & Clench-Aas, 2011) has documented an increase in 
the use of tranquilizers, ADHD medication, antidepressants and 
sleeping pills, as well as more people receiving disability bene-
fits. Nowadays, the leading reason for people being absent from 
work is anxiety and depression (Olsen & Nystuen, 2017). In his 
annual speech 2017, the Director of FHI had exclusion of youth 
as main focus in his presentation. Mjaavatn and Frostad (2016) 
report that 22% of girls (only 3,5% of the boys) in high school 
(aged 16) suffer from emotional problems—a doubling of figures 
in the span of twelve years. Prescription of antidepressants in-
creased by 57% from 2004 to 2014 among girls 15–19 years. Lack 
of self-confidence and dissatisfaction with their own bodies is 
an often-mentioned problem among these girls. These days, the 
Norwegian government is preparing for a new curriculum in 
schools, called “coping with life.”
 While the referenced data may indicate that mental health 
problems in Norway have become more pronounced, the crime 
trend appears to have turned downwards. Taking all the neces-
sary precautions about the difficulties in reading crime statistics 
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(including victim statistics), I take as a given premise for the fur-
ther discussion that Norway (like many other modern societies) 
has become a less crime-prone society the last 15 years. From 
this outset I shall now move from the historical-descriptive pre-
sentation to the analytical-normative discussion, and ask what 
is really gained if less crime is accompanied by more social 
stress? Are we facing a kind of zero-sum game where victories 
in crime prevention correspond to losses in mental well-being? 
What kind of challenge does the new pattern of crime and so-
cial problems present to criminologists? 
Discussion: Crime and Mental Stress—Depression
of Mind Through the Suppression of Crime?
 First, there are many nuances to the story presented above. 
The UN has for 12 consecutive years declared Norway to have 
the best living conditions in the world. Norway (and the Nor-
dic welfare state model in general) has on many occasions been 
declared a success—even by The Economist (2013). I agree with 
these positive evaluations. However, my query is not if the good 
reputation is well deserved, but to ask whether Norwegian so-
ciety in the present phase of the celebrated welfare state should 
be more alert to “silent suffering,” and ask if young people these 
days increasingly channel their stress and frustration inwards 
rather than outwards. Rampant crime will generally trigger 
populist and (often) punitive reactions that, in turn, will insti-
gate political responses. Rampant mental problems, however, 
are not threatening public order in the same way and can there-
fore more easily pass under the political radar. But these prob-
lems are no less damaging for the social integration in a society 
than crime is.   
 My historic overview has shown that the hope of finding the 
sociological (socio-cultural system) correspondent to Keynes 
(economic system) was too optimistic. When the economy broke 
down in the 1930s, Keynes found the recipe to restore the bal-
ance in the economic system. The social scientists of the 1970s 
(and forwards) were unable to do the same towards the so-
cio-cultural system (with the exception from crime post 2000). 
In Sweden (another member of the celebrated Nordic Welfare 
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State), the social scientist Bo Rothstein (2009, p. 126) expressed 
his worries about this situation with this statement:
Therefore, it is not unreasonable to regard the development 
of increasing mental problems among children and youth as 
a very destroying civilization critique that should lead to a 
fundamental re-evaluation among researchers concerning 
the focus of Swedish welfare research. This is not the case. 
Instead, one propagates about how well the Nordic welfare 
model works to create good health for people, and the ques-
tions related to problems among children and youth are ig-
nored…Something has to be fundamentally wrong when 
such a rich society with a well-developed welfare policy pro-
duces that many unhappy children and youth.
 This observation is, as we have seen, highly relevant for 
Norway as well, and Rothstein touches upon the central chal-
lenge in my presentation: high welfare expenditures in one of 
the world’s richest countries do not pay off very well when it 
comes to mental well-being. The inner strain in the Norwegian 
society is probably no less today than 20, 30, or 40 years ago. 
The opposite might be the situation. Even though decreasing 
crime should be appreciated, for a sociologist it is the broad pic-
ture covering both striking out and striking in problems that 
matters. How can we understand “the crime—mental health 
enigma” in context? Of course, statistical co-appearance does 
not signify a causal relationship, but this should not prevent 
us from asking if discipline/control/early intervention strate-
gies in criminal policy could have repercussions when it comes 
to mental health. As a starting point for my discussion, let me 
present an analytical model. 
 My sociological presumption is based on the following 
premises: 
• The socio-cultural system: if individuals (qua individuals)  
 and societies (qua collectivities), are to thrive, some basic  
 values have to be safeguarded. The better these values are  
 taken care of, the better are the chances for optimizing so- 
 cial integration and social welfare (little crime and sound  
 mental health).
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• The economic system: if an open free market economy is  
 to prosper, there are other (often contradictory) values that  
 have to be given precedence. Figure 1 represents an ideal  
 type presentation of these respective values.
Figure 1: Ideal type of the economic and the socio-cultural 
system
 The space does not permit an elaboration of each couple of 
concepts (see Leonardsen, 2015). It suffices to say that taken as 
ideal types (in Max Weber’s sense) there is an obvious value 
conflict between the two systems. This means that when the 
balance between these two sets of values changes, one will 
easily (but not nomothetically) experience a zero-sum situation. 
As documented above, during the last thirty years, the econom-
ic value system has increasingly gained precedence at the cost 
of the socio-cultural value system. What one side has gained, 
the other has lost. The result has been a tougher social climate.
 In “Crime in Japan: Paradise Lost?” (Leonardsen, 2010) I 
asked if Japan (around 2010) was facing a situation where “the 
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suppression of crime” had come at the price of “the suppres-
sion of mind?” Like in Norway, Japanese society had succeeded 
in turning a negative crime trend through the 1990s, but ex-
perienced, at the same time, an increase in suicides and social 
withdrawal (hikikomori) among youth. One used to say about 
Japanese people that they are “policing themselves” (Bailey, 
1976) due to a Confucian/Buddhist ideology based on self-re-
flection, shame, and discipline (Leonardsen, 2004). The impact 
of this cultural superstructure has been a strong counter-force 
against striking out processes rooted in rapid economic and so-
cial change in Japan. Accordingly, low crime rates in this coun-
try have been explained in cultural terms (Confucianism/Bud-
dhism as vaccination against crime).  
 Moving our eyes to the West, it is relevant to ask to what 
extent neo-liberalism (cf. free trade economy) and neo-conser-
vatism (more individual responsibility) could be described as 
functional equivalents to Confucianism/Buddhism in Japan. 
Do both these (originally) Western thought systems generate 
strong self-control with their accompanying self-blaming con-
sequences? Slogans like “Back to Basics” (the British Conserva-
tives, 1995) and “Back to Family Values” (the first Bush admin-
istration) have had their corresponding, government-initiated 
campaigns in Norway (a special “Value Commission” in 1998), 
with a message connoting much of the self-disciplining Asia 
value foundation. I am not arguing that neo-liberalism and 
neo-conservatism are ideological cousins of Confucianism/ 
Buddhism. Neither am I saying that Norway is England or the 
U.S. It is not. However, I am asking whether the consequences 
of an economic man model in alliance with a moral conserva-
tism, of which we can find elements of even in Norway, might 
be comparable at the individual level. The distance between an 
Asian shame culture and a Western, neo-liberal culture, based 
on a de-centred way of governing, with auto-regulated or au-
to-correcting individuals, might not be so big.
 A starting point for such a discussion could be the work of 
French philosopher Dufour (2008), who in his book “The Art of 
Shrinking Heads: On the New Servitude of the Liberated in the 
Age of Total Capitalism,” has questioned the effects of neo-lib-
eralism on people’s mental health. According to Dufour, the 
Kantian “critical subject” and the Freudian “neurotic subject” 
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has in post-modern society been replaced by a “post-modern 
subject” (Dufour talks about “an anthropological mutation”), 
characterized by flexibility, adaptability—and rootlessness. In 
post-modern society, the autonomous subject experiences strong 
pressure to create her/his own unique identity. In the era of “liq-
uid modernity” (Bauman, 2000), the individual inhabits a border-
less space with apparently total freedom, and a “with consump-
tion as all things” aim and meaning. The market has become 
the ultimate rationality for guiding us. The problem is that the 
market cannot create meaning. Dufour raises the challenging 
question of whether neo-liberalism has made people internalise 
the old slogan “every man the architect of his own fortune.” If 
one fails in a society with so many options, there is no one to 
blame but oneself. This might easily generate self-repressing and 
self-controlling mechanisms that can manifest as mental health 
problems. These problems (like depression, drug addiction, etc.) 
are not epiphenomena constructed by the media but signs of a 
crisis that especially affects young people (Dufour, 2008). 
 The same perspective is echoed in the debate on positive 
thinking. Schwartz (2015, p. 4) writes about mental problems 
in modern society (“an explosive growth of depression,” p. 3) 
where an individualistic culture biases people towards making 
causal attributions that focus on internal rather than external 
causal factors. People are told they are free to choose, while a 
substantial many rather experience a lack of control in their 
lives. Davis (2015, p. 4), focusing on what he calls “The happi-
ness industry,” argues that, “the future of successful capitalism 
depends on our ability to combat stress, misery, illness, and put 
relaxation, happiness and wellness in their place.” Those in a 
competitive society who do not keep up with demands turn 
their disappointments inwards instead of outwards.  
 In Norway, the media debate on youth and mental health 
problems has for some years centred on concepts like “Gen-
eration Clever” or “Generation Performance” (cf. the PISA 
examinations). Private company language, like “deliver the 
goods” and “it’s all up to you,” has become common speech 
not only within the economic system, but in the socio-cultural 
system as well (schools and even kindergartens). Everyone has 
to pull her/his weight.
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 Changes in mental health conditions in a society are hard 
to interpret and analyze, and perhaps Dufour (2008) and other 
scholars of worry are painting a too dreary picture of life in 
post-modern society. However, my historical overview, and the 
fact that The World Health Organisation (WHO) has identified 
depression as the number two cause of death (prospected to be 
number one in 2030) in Western countries, should invite a dis-
cussion on how to interpret the development of mental health 
problems during the last few years (Ehrenberg, 2010). Even 
though it is difficult to understand what we are really measur-
ing when we talk about mental problems (for example, what 
amount of change is due to a growth in diagnoses and diagnos-
ing professions, and what is due to real changes?), compared to 
the huge amount of money spent on mental disorder preven-
tion, the situation is paradoxical.
 When Merton (1968) presented his anomie theory (notice: 
also called strain theory), he wrote (in a Durkheimian spirit) 
about different types of adaptation to disjunctions between 
goals and means in a society. People could strike out as “inno-
vators” or “rebels,” but, alternatively, they could strike inwards 
and become “retreatists.” The relevant point for my discussion 
is that strain in a society can have many different outlets, of 
which crime is but one. Of course, decreasing crime rates should 
be celebrated as a pleasant and likely indication of social inte-
gration, but not without precautions (see Christie, 2004). It is the 
total picture of deviance that should have the main attention, 
even for criminologists. 
 A society’s health condition taken as a whole is dependent 
on many different variables, and these variables should be seen 
in connection to each other. When Freud in 1929 wrote about 
“Civilization and its Discontents,” he wrote about human pain 
due to the conflict between Eros (love) and Thanatos (death). 
Nowadays, this cultural discontent should rather be presented 
in Mertonian terms as a clash between cultural goals (success) 
and certain groups’ lack of access (by conventional means) to 
achieving those goals. In a modern version of Merton, Jock 
Young (2007, p. 32) talks about the bulimic society, “where mas-
sive cultural inclusion is accompanied by systematic structural 
exclusion”—a society that both absorbs (through mass media, 
mass education, consumer markets, etc.) and rejects (through 
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unequal chances of taking full advantage of these arenas). Ac-
cordingly, the combination of cultural inclusion and economic 
exclusion is for Young the key to the humiliation and resentment 
experienced by those with the least resources. “The exclusive 
society” (Young, 1999) is a society that produces relative depri-
vation and ontological insecurity in a way that is denigrating 
and humiliating. Not having access to even the lower reaches of 
the labour market, failing to achieve in a middle-class-oriented 
school system, or living in poverty amidst affluence, is likely to 
produce tensions with outcomes that can strike inwards as well 
as outwards.    
 Having this broader perspective in mind, I end my presen-
tation about the successful Norwegian welfare society by being 
a “mood killer.” In spite of all the well-deserved praise of this 
model, there is reason to listen carefully to the aforementioned 
comment by Bo Rothstein, namely that the mental health situa-
tion among young people today might be taken as a very civili-
zation destroying critique. Something is wrong when so much 
money is spent on welfare measures, but still so many are un-
happy about their lives. 
 The question remains: how should this challenge be met? If 
Wilkinson and Pickett are correct (2010), politicians should stop 
treating social problems as separate phenomena with no inter-
nal connections. Doctors and nurses treat ill health, police and 
prisons deal with crime, remedial teachers and educational psy-
chologists tackle educational problems, and social workers and 
other health-promotion specialists deal with “the rest.” The re-
sults of all these interventions are modest, while new problems 
are continuously recreated. An open market economy based on 
liberalistic principles is hard to combine with a political and so-
ciological demand for equality, which, in turn, is important for 
social integration. No doubt, Norway has pursued a policy of 
equality over many years. However, this policy of re-distribu-
tion has not been enough to prevent increasing social problems. 
Neither have a huge number of action plans (from bullying- and 
poverty- to crime- and drug-programs) had the expected out-
comes (Leonardsen, 2015). So what conclusion could be drawn 
from this paradox? 
 My intention is not to undermine the importance of practi-
cal, short-term, and imaginative social reforms. Solving problems 
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will often invite delimited actions based on scarce resources. 
However, if the floor is wet, we should not restrict our efforts to 
wiping up with a rag. Someone has to look for the open water tap, 
and check if it can be turned off. At different times through the 
last forty years, Labour governments in Norway did recognize—
at the rhetorical level—that it would be difficult, even impossi-
ble, to find social preventive measures that would work without 
political control of the economy. Since that time, this control has 
declined essentially. According to Fukuyama (1999, p. 4), “there 
is a widespread acknowledgement that in post-industrial societ-
ies further improvement cannot be achieved through ambitious 
social engineering.” The case of Norway, where such ambitions 
have reached unprecedented levels, should represent an interest-
ing starting point for elaborating Fukuyama’s thesis.
Author’s note: Originally, the Labour Party documents were studied at 
The Norwegian Labour Movement Archives and Library in Oslo (https://
www.arbark.no/InEnglish.htm). Later this material was digitized, and 
those documents are cited in this paper.
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